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Abstract This paper considers the justifiability of criminalising anti-social behaviour 
through two-step prohibitions such as the Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO). The UK 
government has recently proposed to abolish and replace the ASBO; however, the proposed 
new orders would retain many of its most controversial features. The paper begins by 
criticising the definition of anti-social behaviour employed in both the current legislation and 
the new proposals. This definition is objectionable because it makes criminalisation 
contingent upon the irrational judgements of (putative) victims, and its often modest 
preventive benefits come at a high cost to citizens’ liberty and autonomy. The paper then 
goes on to propose a new definition of anti-social behaviour that would meet these 
objections: that is, as a course of conduct that causes others to experience serious and 
justifiable anxiety about the safety of their local community. Whilst this definition identifies 
a serious form of wrongdoing, its precise scope is inevitably uncertain. The paper thus 
concludes that we have good reason to use two-step prohibitions such as the ASBO to 
regulate such conduct, so as to enable the use of the criminal law against it whilst minimising 
possible concerns of legality arising from the proposed definition’s uncertain scope. 
 
Introduction 
 
The Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) is a British criminal justice measure which aims to 
prevent anti-social conduct – currently defined as behaviour that ‘caused or was likely to 
cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as 
[the actor]’ (Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s. 1(1)). As a criminal prohibition, it is theoretically 
interesting because of its ‘two-step’ structure. Ostensibly, the ASBO is not a criminal penalty 
but a form of civil injunction. Anti-social behaviour, as defined above, is not a criminal offence: 
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rather, it is the conduct that qualifies one for an ASBO. If a court is satisfied, following either 
civil application proceedings or a criminal conviction, that a defendant has behaved anti-
socially, then it may make an order containing any conditions ‘necessary for the purpose of 
protecting persons... from further anti-social acts by the defendant’ (ss. 1(4), 1(6)). However, 
ASBOs are unlike ordinary civil injunctions in that breach is a criminal offence, punishable by 
up to five years’ imprisonment (s. 1(10)). The ASBO scheme thus effectively grants courts the 
power to create individualised, serious criminal offences, in order to prevent conduct that is 
not necessarily independently prohibited.1 
 In July 2010, the UK’s new coalition government proposed to abolish and replace the 
ASBO. The order had been one of the previous Labour administration’s flagship criminal policy 
measures. According to the new Home Secretary, though, the ASBO had become ‘a conveyor 
belt to serious crime and prison’, which had failed to act ‘as a serious deterrent’ where 
needed. As such, she pledged to replace it with new sanctions that would be ‘easier to obtain 
and to enforce’ but also, if possible, ‘rehabilitating and restorative’ (May 2010). These latter 
words, at least, would have been welcomed by many within the criminal law academy. The 
ASBO had been widely criticised within this sphere for its apparent ineffectiveness and 
questionable political motivations, but also for deeper reasons of moral and legal principle.2 
 The recent publication of the promised new proposals suggests, however, that earlier 
reports of the ASBO’s demise were exaggerated. Whilst these proposals would see the term 
‘ASBO’ removed from the statute books, two new measures would take its place that would 
retain many of its most distinctive and controversial features. First, Criminal Behaviour Orders 
would effectively replace ASBOs imposed following criminal proceedings. These would 
continue to target conduct that causes or is likely to cause harassment, alarm and distress to 
others, and would permit courts to ban individuals from certain activities or places, on pain 
of criminal conviction (Home Office 2011, pp. 14-15). Second, Crime Prevention Injunctions 
would replace ASBOs made in civil proceedings. Breach of these injunctions would be 
punished as contempt of court, rather than as a criminal offence; however, civil rules of 
                                                 
1 Some behaviour that causes harassment, alarm or distress to others constitutes an offence under the Public 
Order Act 1986, s. 5. However, for the purposes of this offence, it must be shown that the defendant intended 
his behaviour to be, or was reckless as to his behaviour being, ‘threatening, abusive or insulting’: s. 6(4). The 
definition of anti-social behaviour, by contrast, has no such mens rea requirement. 
2 This paper concerns only these latter, principled criticisms. For an in-depth critique of anti-social behaviour 
legislation and policy from a socio-legal perspective, see Burney (2009).  
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evidence would govern application proceedings, whilst custodial sentences would remain 
available for breach. Additionally, the Home Office is contemplating extending the range of 
conduct in respect of which such an injunction could be imposed to cover conduct that causes 
or is likely to cause mere ‘nuisance or annoyance’ to other persons (ibid., pp. 16-18). 
 There are at least two reasons why these new proposals will disappoint those who 
have criticised the ASBO on principled grounds. The first is that they retain the ASBO’s two-
step format. The new proposals would eliminate one problematic aspect of this model: courts 
would no longer have the power to create individualised criminal offences as a result of civil 
proceedings. Nevertheless, the proposed injunctions would continue to permit severe 
restrictions of liberty and to threaten penalties that would be disproportionate to the 
relatively trivial wrongdoing that they aim to prevent. At least in the case of the Crime 
Prevention Injunction, they would also continue to offer only weak due process protections 
to defendants.3 
 Second, these proposals would retain the problematic definition of anti-social 
behaviour as conduct that causes harassment, alarm and distress to others – or, in the case 
of the Crime Prevention Injunction, would even contemplate extending this definition. This 
definition is problematic for obvious reasons: it catches an extremely wide range of conduct 
that goes far beyond the kinds of behaviour typically understood as ‘anti-social’ within public 
discourse. Arguably, though, there are even deeper problems with this definition as an object 
of state regulation. In particular, we might think that it identifies conduct that is not truly 
harmful but merely offensive, which should prompt us to be particularly cautious or sceptical 
about its employment in the criminal law. 
 In this paper, I will argue that a principled case can be made for criminalising some 
forms of anti-social behaviour through a two-step prohibition such as the ASBO. In doing so, 
I will not dispute much of the criticism just outlined: indeed, I will suggest that it may be 
decisive against both the ASBO in its current form and its proposed replacements. Rather, my 
aim is to identify the valuable ideals underlying such schemes, and to suggest how these might 
be given better expression in the legislation. I begin in part 1 by aiming to elucidate why the 
current statutory definition of anti-social behaviour is objectionable as a basis for a criminal 
                                                 
3 Numerous prominent commentators have criticised the ASBO and other two-step orders on these or similar 
grounds: see e.g. Ashworth (2004), Ashworth & Zedner (2010), Gardner et al (1998), Simester & von Hirsch 
(2011) ch. 12, von Hirsch et al (1995). 
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prohibition. The problem, I suggest, is not necessarily that this definition is based on injury to 
psychological interests, rather than interests of other sorts. Rather, the problem is that 
negative feelings such as harassment, alarm and distress are belief-mediated, and hence can 
be based on unreasonable judgements. Additionally, the breadth of the current statutory 
definition is problematic. Whilst its preventive benefits will often be modest, its impact on 
citizens’ autonomy is great, since almost anyone will from time to time be guilty of doing 
things which might harass, alarm or distress others. 
 I then go on, in the second part of the paper, to consider how we might re-define anti-
social behaviour in order to meet these objections. I suggest that we should define anti-social 
behaviour as a course of conduct that causes others to experience serious and justifiable 
anxiety about the safety of their local community. This change would improve on the current 
definition in several ways. First, by drawing attention to the local context of anti-social 
behaviour and its cumulative impact on residents’ quality of life, it would identify what is both 
distinctive and serious about the worst cases of such conduct. Second, it would strike a much 
more favourable balance than the current definition between the preventive goals of 
criminalisation and its impact on citizens’ liberty and autonomy. Third, by limiting liability to 
those who have caused justifiable anxiety, it eliminates the possibility that the criminalisation 
of anti-social conduct will be made contingent upon irrational judgements. 
 In the final part of the paper, I turn to consider the legitimacy of two-step prohibitions. 
These are often thought to be problematic because they impose criminal liability for mere 
defiance: the behaviours that they prohibit may not otherwise be criminal. By contrast, I will 
argue that two-step prohibitions can be used as a way of clarifying pre-existing legal duties 
and granting actors some margin of error as to their scope. Whilst the definition of anti-social 
behaviour proposed in the previous section improves on the current definition in several 
important ways, its precise scope remains uncertain. Two-step prohibitions provide a way of 
using the criminal law to deal with such conduct whilst minimising the legality concerns that 
the definition’s uncertainty would generate. 
 
The Current Definition 
 
Anti-social behaviour is currently defined as behaviour that caused or was likely to cause 
harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same household as the actor. 
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This definition is accompanied by a defence: courts must exclude from consideration 
behaviour that the actor can show is ‘reasonable in the circumstances’ (s. 1(5)). In this first 
section, I will argue that this definition is too broad. At the outset, we should remind ourselves 
of a potential complication: the range of conduct that can be criminalised by particular ASBOs 
is even wider than that falling within the statutory definition, as ASBOs can include any 
restriction deemed necessary to prevent the actor from engaging in further anti-social acts. 
For reasons that will become obvious in due course, though, I leave this complication aside 
for the moment. Instead I simply ask whether the conduct caught by the current definition 
can legitimately be criminalised. 
 How should we determine whether we may criminalise a given type of conduct? The 
theoretical literature on this issue is relatively small, but developing.4 Broadly, a consensus 
has formed against thinking of criminalisation decisions in terms of a crude ‘balancing’ of 
reasons for and against. Rather, we should recognise that legitimate criminalisation has a 
number of distinct necessary conditions, which are only sufficient in combination (Schonsheck 
1994). The precise form and content of these conditions is, unsurprisingly, not yet widely 
agreed upon. However, it has been suggested that we might structure our discussions by 
beginning with considerations of moral principle, before moving progressively towards 
pragmatic considerations arising from the law’s institutional context (ibid.). A single paper 
clearly cannot hope to address adequately all such relevant concerns, particularly at the 
pragmatic end of the spectrum. An appropriately modest aim is therefore to highlight a range 
of conditions that is wide enough, if those conditions are satisfied, to yield a prima facie case 
for criminalisation. 
 At the purest level of moral principle, the most important and obvious constraint on 
the content of the criminal law is that, at least ideally, only wrongful conduct may be 
criminalised. We are only permitted to condemn those actors who have committed wrongs; 
thus, because criminal conviction and punishment have an inherently condemnatory, 
stigmatic aspect, they should only attach to wrongful conduct.5 In assessing the legitimacy of 
the current definition of anti-social behaviour, it will therefore be helpful to enquire about 
                                                 
4 For a survey, see Husak (2008) pp. 58-61. More recent entries include the various contributions to Duff et al 
(2010) and Simester & von Hirsch (2011). 
5 Husak argues that this constraint is also implied by the doctrines of the general part of the criminal law itself: 
(2008) pp. 72-76. 
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the moral status of the conduct within its scope. Given that anti-social behaviour is defined 
as behaviour that causes harassment, alarm or distress to others, its putative wrongness must 
presumably derive from its propensity to cause such negative feelings. We can thus begin by 
asking: does the fact that some action will or might cause harassment, alarm or distress to 
others generate a duty not to perform it? 
 Even if this question has a positive answer, the fact that the current statutory 
definition catches behaviour that is morally wrongful will clearly not be sufficient to vindicate 
it. A second widely agreed constraint on criminalisation is that the wrongdoing targeted by a 
criminal prohibition should also be the state’s business: to use the familiar expression, it 
should be publicly wrongful.6 There are several ways in which some kind of wrongdoing might 
fall outside the state’s jurisdiction. One is that the interests set back by the relevant 
wrongdoing are not themselves within the state’s jurisdiction: either because they do not 
represent shared values of the political community (Duff & Marshall 1998), or simply because 
the state is not responsible for protecting them (Lamond 2007). Here, then, is another way of 
challenging the current definition of anti-social behaviour. Even if it would be morally 
wrongful to cause harassment, alarm or distress to another, are these the kinds of effects 
from which the state specifically should protect us? 
 One device that is often employed in order to limit the scope of the state’s jurisdiction 
in this way is the harm principle. Many versions of this principle exist, of varying strength. 
Roughly speaking, though, they all embody a commitment to a common idea: that the 
criminal law should primarily be a way of dealing with harmful wrongdoing. By implication, 
we should be sceptical or cautious about criminalising other kinds of wrongdoing that are not 
harmful.7 This might be thought to cast doubt on the legitimacy of the current statutory 
definition of anti-social behaviour. As we have seen, this definition implies that the wrongness 
of anti-social behaviour consists in its propensity to cause negative feelings such as 
harassment, alarm and distress. On one popular view, such bad feelings do not constitute 
                                                 
6 Some strict retributivists disagree, holding that moral wrongness alone provides the only principled 
constraint on, as well as the only valid positive reason for, criminalisation, and that the state is obliged to 
create institutions that aim to punish the morally deserving: see e.g. Moore (1997) chs 2-4. 
7 The seminal philosophical treatments of the harm principle are those of Mill (1859) and Feinberg (1984). 
There are well-documented problems with the harm principle as a way of constraining the scope of the 
criminal law, which I will not dwell on here: see Duff (2007) ch. 6. 
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harm but mere ‘offence’.8 If we subscribe to this view, as well as to the harm principle, then 
we should doubt that the state is permitted to criminalise conduct merely on the basis of its 
propensity to cause negative emotions. 
 Andrew Simester and Andreas von Hirsch hold this kind of view about the 
criminalisation of anti-social behaviour. According to their understanding of the harm 
principle, criminalisation is easiest to justify when the conduct to be criminalised leads – 
whether directly, indirectly or remotely – to harm to others. In their view, unwelcome mental 
states alone do not qualify as harms for the purposes of this principle. Rather, harm consists 
in setbacks to our interests: which is to say, in the ‘diminution of our wherewithal, our means 
and capacities, for pursuing a good life and facing its challenges’ (2011, p. 36). Negative 
feelings might sometimes lead to setbacks of this kind: most obviously, they might lead to 
psychological harms, such as trauma or the impaired ability to conduct everyday tasks. 
However, bad feelings alone are not harmful. As such, to criminalise conduct on the grounds 
that it harasses, alarms or distresses others does not satisfy the harm principle, as Simester 
and von Hirsch understand it. For them, the range of offensive conduct that may be 
criminalised is likely in practice to extend only to that which has harmful effects (ibid., ch. 7).  
 Nevertheless, Simester and von Hirsch do not wish to deny the logical possibility that 
‘merely’ offensive conduct may properly be criminalised. The prevention of offence is, they 
believe, a valid goal of criminalisation; its pursuit must simply be subjected to certain 
mediating principles that do not apply to the criminalisation of harmful wrongdoing (ibid, ch. 
8). The need for such principles arises (the argument goes) from the unique structure of 
offensive wrongdoing. Unlike harmful wrongs, offensive wrongs are not wrongs in virtue of 
their effects: since we have no general moral duty not to make others feel bad, the mere 
propensity to cause negative feelings cannot be a wrong-making feature. Rather, offensive 
conduct is wrongful – if and when it is – because of its disrespectful character. Properly 
understood, offensive conduct violates the conventions that regulate our social interactions. 
Whilst these conventions are not valuable in themselves, they are instrumentally valuable 
because, and to the extent that, they help to secure such things as the expression of respect, 
and the boundaries between our public and private lives (ibid., chs. 6.1-6.3). 
                                                 
8 The word ‘offence’ in this context is usually understood to refer to negative mental states generally, rather 
than to its ordinary-language synonyms such as ‘affront’ and ‘disgust’: see Feinberg (1985) p. 1. 
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 Are Simester and von Hirsch correct that the wrongness of so-called offensive conduct 
is never explicable in terms of its impact on others’ feelings? We should doubt that they are. 
In many imaginable circumstances, it seems clear that we have a duty not to cause others to 
experience negative feelings – and, what is more, that we have such a duty precisely because 
our actions would have this result. For example, imagine that I am a pilot on a commercial 
flight carrying a large number of passengers. Motivated solely by my own amusement, I 
decide to fly in the direction of a tall building, pulling away from it only at the last second. This 
causes the passengers – and, presumably, the occupants of the building – to experience 
immense distress. Since I have no reason to do this besides amusing myself, it seems clear 
enough that I ought not to do it. It is also clear that the reason that I ought not to do it is that 
doing so will cause immense distress to a large number of people without adequate 
justification.9 In this respect, negative feelings are relevantly like physical pains and other 
unwelcome sensations. There are certainly cases in which we are justified in causing them, 
but the possibility that some action will cause them nevertheless provides a moral reason 
against performing that action. 
 Of course, there are other respects in which negative feelings differ materially from 
physical pains. Most obviously, we exercise a degree of control over our mental states that 
we do not typically exercise over sensations of other kinds. In particular – and as is often 
noted in this context – feelings like harassment, alarm and distress are sometimes ‘belief-
mediated’.10 A feeling is belief-mediated to the extent that it is caused by the formation of 
some belief about the world. For instance, I might feel alarmed by your presence because I 
believe that you pose a threat to me. This unique feature of feelings is plausibly important to 
discussions of criminalisation. Since we exercise a degree of control over our beliefs, we also 
have a degree of control over whether or not we suffer belief-mediated negative feelings. 
One might therefore think that we are to an extent morally responsible for the occurrence of 
such feelings, even when they are prompted by the actions of others. 
 Once again, though, it is difficult to believe that we do not have duties to cause belief-
mediated negative feelings simply because we exercise some degree of control over them. 
The distress experienced by the passengers on my plane is doubtless mediated by the belief 
                                                 
9 For clarity’s sake, assume that my abilities as a pilot are such that I would not physically endanger the 
passengers by performing this manoeuvre.  
10 In particular, see Thomson (1990) ch. 10.3. 
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(over which they have some control) that my conduct endangers them; nevertheless, that 
conduct is surely wrongful.11 Rather, the uniquely problematic aspect of belief-mediation 
does not become apparent until we consider cases in which the relevant beliefs are 
unreasonable. It is cases of this sort that cast the greatest doubt on the idea that the mere 
propensity to cause negative feelings could be sufficient to ground a criminal prohibition.12 
Under the current definition of anti-social behaviour, one’s criminal liability is made 
contingent upon the unreasonable judgements of others. To illustrate this, consider the 
following case: 
 
Loitering Teenagers: A group of teenagers has taken to loitering on a housing estate 
at night time. Local residents are alarmed by the group’s presence, believing that they 
pose a threat. This belief, however, is irrational: the group has given residents no 
reason to believe that they pose a threat of any kind. 
 
The teenagers in this case have caused alarm to the residents. Thus, unless they can show 
that their conduct was ‘reasonable in the circumstances’, they will be caught by the definition 
of anti-social behaviour and therefore liable to an ASBO. For the purposes of this judgement, 
it matters not that the residents’ alarm was mediated by irrational beliefs. This immediately 
seems objectionable – but why?  
 The answer lies partly in the fact that the putative victims in such cases can control 
their negative feelings – but only partly. The current definition of anti-social behaviour is 
problematic not only because it makes actors’ criminal liability contingent upon the 
judgements of others, but because it does so unfairly. The imposition of general duties to 
avoid negative effects, whether moral or legal, inevitably impacts upon actors’ autonomy: it 
impairs their ability to pursue valuable options. Such autonomy violations are particularly 
egregious, however, when the duties at issue are duties to avoid bringing about consequences 
that other agents are, normatively speaking, better placed to avert. This is the problem with 
imposing duties to avoid causing just any belief-mediated negative feeling. If we oblige the 
                                                 
11 For further defence of the view that belief-mediation alone cannot explain why we ought not to treat 
negative feelings as we treat other kinds of harm, see Tadros (2011) pp. 39-42. 
12 Compare Feinberg (1985), who believed that the reasonableness of feelings should play no role in 
criminalisation decisions. Critics of Feinberg in this regard include Duff & Marshall (2006) and Simester and von 
Hirsch (2011). 
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teenagers in the above case not to loiter, then we restrict their autonomy in order to avert 
alarm to the residents, despite the fact that the residents could also avert this alarm simply 
by making the judgements about the situation that we could reasonably expect them to make. 
The teenagers can properly object to this, even though the propensity of their conduct to 
cause alarm remains a valid reason for them not to engage in it.  
 At this point, one might interject that the current statutory scheme governing anti-
social behaviour allows the teenagers to make such an objection. As we have seen, conduct 
is to be disregarded in ASBO application proceedings if the defendant can show that it is 
reasonable in the circumstances. Might not the teenagers be able to demonstrate this if they 
can show that the residents’ responses to their behaviour were unreasonable, and that to 
prohibit them from loitering would thus unduly restrict their autonomy? 
It is not a foregone conclusion that such a demonstration would be regarded as 
showing that the teenagers’ conduct was reasonable. However, even if such a defence were 
possible, the statutory definition would remain problematic. Whilst the potential causation 
of belief-mediated negative feelings provides a moral reason against action, it is not typically 
sufficient to make that action wrongful. This conclusion also depends on whether it is fair to 
demand that the actor potentially forego valuable options in order to protect the feelings of 
others – which in turn depends, inter alia, on the reasonableness of the beliefs underlying 
those feelings. This is the grain of truth at the heart of Simester and von Hirsch’s view that we 
have no general duty not to cause negative feelings. Since the reasonableness of those 
feelings is also typically at issue, simply to cause such feelings is not a presumptive wrong of 
the kind for which the state may call us to account. As such, prohibitions on causing negative 
feelings should include the reasonableness of those feelings in the definition of the conduct 
that the state must prove – and not simply as an issue to be raised by the defendant.13 
All of this leads to the conclusion that the current statutory definition of anti-social 
behaviour targets non-wrongful conduct. This objection does not stem from the definition’s 
concern with the causation of negative feelings, as opposed to unwelcome effects of other 
sorts. Rather, it stems from the definition’s failure to account for the fact that feelings are 
sometimes belief-mediated, and that they can therefore arise from unreasonable beliefs. As 
we have already seen, though, this is not the only ground on which we might object to the 
                                                 
13 On the idea of criminal offences as presumptive wrongs for which the state may call us to answer, see Duff 
(2007) ch. 9. 
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current definition. Even if we were to conclude that the definition catches wrongful conduct, 
we might still argue that the state ought not to concern itself with protecting us from effects 
like harassment, alarm and distress. Is this so? 
 In answering this question, we must consider the compatibility of such preventive 
goals with the preservation of other important values, such as liberty and autonomy.14 As we 
will see below, anti-social behaviour is capable of causing severe harms. However, isolated 
instances of harassment, alarm and distress do not count amongst these. Such negative 
feelings are often fleeting and trivial: we encounter them frequently in everyday life and deal 
with them easily. By contrast, the current statutory definition greatly damages citizens’ 
autonomy. Under it, we are no longer totally free to do many of the trivial things that might 
cause others to experience harassment, alarm or distress: as we have seen, even the 
exception for conduct that is reasonable in the circumstances functions only as a defence. 
Additionally, the current definition includes no culpability requirement, meaning that liability 
for anti-social behaviour is effectively strict. Taken together, these facts make it difficult for 
us to act in ways that we can be certain will avoid liability to an ASBO. 
 These problems are further exacerbated when we consider the possibility of the non-
ideal application of the current definition.15 The current definition is so wide that anyone 
might conceivably be caught by it: few if any of us could claim never to have acted in a way 
that harassed, alarmed or distressed another, even in the recent past. Such breadth in 
criminal prohibitions is always a cause for concern, for it grants enforcement agencies almost 
total discretion as to who becomes criminally liable. In turn, there is a risk that enforcement 
will become inconsistent and unpredictable or (worse) discriminatory (Husak 2008, ch. 1.II). 
Experience in the anti-social behaviour context justifies these fears. There are several 
notorious examples of ASBOs falling far outside the originally stated purpose of the 
legislation, which instead seem to be ways of controlling behaviour perceived to be 
undesirable or troublesome. For example, ASBOs have prohibited (amongst other things) 
making sarcastic remarks, jumping into canals or rivers and allowing pigs and geese to escape 
from one’s land (Macdonald 2006, pp. 195-203). 
                                                 
14 For further analysis of the role of the balance between liberty and security in criminalisation decisions, see 
Tadros (2008). 
15 On the importance of analysing the non-ideal effects of a prohibition in criminalisation decisions, see 
Schonsheck (1994) pp. 70-79; Tadros (2008) pp. 949-951. 
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All of this suggests that the current statutory definition of anti-social behaviour does 
not target conduct that may legitimately be criminalised. Certainly, we should not be sceptical 
about the criminalisation of conduct that causes negative feelings simply because it targets 
setbacks to psychological interests, rather than interests of other kinds. However, such 
feelings are ruled out as a basis for criminalisation to the extent that they are based on 
unreasonable beliefs. Additionally, the current definition targets wrongdoing that is often 
very trivial at a great cost to citizens’ autonomy. It also leaves an intolerably large scope for 
the operation of official discretion. We should therefore conclude that, even if the conduct 
within the scope of the current definition is sometimes morally wrongful, much of it lies 
outside the proper scope of the criminal law. 
 
Redefining Anti-Social Behaviour 
 
I turn now to consider how we might redefine anti-social behaviour in order to address the 
concerns just expressed. As I stated at the outset, I propose that anti-social behaviour should 
be defined as a course of conduct that causes others to experience serious and justifiable 
anxiety about the safety of their local community. This choice of wording probably appears 
somewhat arbitrary at first sight. As we will see, though, the focus on anxiety provides a way 
of explaining the pre-theoretical categorisation of a seemingly disparate range of behaviours 
as ‘anti-social’. Additionally, the recognition of the cumulative impact of such behaviour on 
quality of life and the importance of local context is faithful to the stated motivations of the 
original proposals for the ASBO. Thus, the proposed change will hopefully command support 
as a way of avoiding the problems of the current definition.16 
 I should begin by outlining what I hope is an uncontroversial and common-sense 
account of the nature of anxiety. The experience of anxiety is primarily characterised by its 
psychological aspects, particularly feelings of unease and apprehension; however, it also 
typically involves physical feelings of nervousness. These feelings can be strongly unpleasant, 
even in isolated cases. If they persist for long enough, then subjects can feel physically 
exhausted, and find it difficult to concentrate on other aspects of their lives. In these respects, 
feelings of anxiety are materially similar to the ‘fight-or-flight’ response that characterises 
                                                 
16 For an alternative kind of approach, which aims to rationalise anti-social behaviour legislation and policy in 
its current form, see Ramsay (2004; 2008). 
13 
 
fear. They are also similar to fear in terms of their causes: they are always related, more or 
less directly, to the perception of potential threats.17 
 Indeed, on this view, fear is perhaps best thought of as a type of anxiety, 
distinguishable by its relationship to a conscious perception of a more or less concrete threat. 
Because fears are generated by conscious perception, a fearful person can always readily 
provide an explanation (whether rational or otherwise) of why they are afraid. By contrast, 
other forms of anxiety may be caused by a perception of the mere abstract possibility of a 
threat, or by perceptions of threats that are unconscious. Thus, anxious people will often have 
to reflect on their condition in order to explain it. This is true, for example, of many people 
who experience social anxiety. It may ultimately be possible for me to explain why (say) I feel 
anxious about meeting new people: perhaps I am concerned that I might not be able to 
control their first impressions of me, that they might not like or respect me, that we might 
not get on well and so forth. However, I would probably only arrive at such an explanation 
after actively interrogating my own unconscious motivations.  
To further illustrate this, consider another familiar form of anxiety that is not 
prompted by particular threats: anxiety arising from a perceived lack of control. If we search 
deep enough for an explanation of such anxiety, then we will probably conclude that if we 
lack control over some sphere of our lives, then we will be unable to deal with any threats 
that might arise within it in the future. This type of anxiety is characteristic of anti-social 
behaviour cases. An unwelcome person who invades some private space of yours, such as 
your home or neighbourhood, may well cause you to feel anxious.18 This is because their 
presence will cause you to feel that you lack control over that space. These effects will be 
particularly pronounced in the contexts of our home and private lives, since these are the 
spheres over which we typically expect to have the greatest degree of control. Interference 
in these contexts tends to make us feel nervous and uneasy even in the absence of particular, 
consciously perceived threats.19 
                                                 
17 I use ‘threat’ here in its broadest sense, to refer to the possibility of any unwelcome state of affairs. 
18 For example, many of the most serious cases of anti-social behaviour involve ‘nuisance neighbours’. Whilst 
such cases are comparatively rare, they are much more likely than cases of other kinds to have a high impact 
on the quality of the lives of their victims: see Millie (2009) pp. 23-25. The explanation for this is, presumably, 
that such behaviour is more likely to inhibit victims’ peaceful enjoyment of their home lives. 
19 This insight – that wellbeing is significantly related to the extent to which some spheres of our lives are 
accessible to others – is sometimes thought to be the foundation of a right to privacy: see e.g. Gavison (1980). 
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 These brief remarks suggest that anxiety can have a range of different causes, despite 
the underlying connection to at least a potential threat. It is therefore unsurprising that a 
wide range of conduct can also cause us to feel anxious. The disparate nature of the concept 
of anti-social behaviour reflects this. Confusingly, the sorts of behaviour that we collectively 
refer to as anti-social are often independently wrongful, quite apart from their propensity to 
cause anxiety. Indeed, they may even be independently worthy of criminalisation. For 
instance, consider such familiar forms of anti-social behaviour as vandalism, noise nuisances 
and persistent harassment. These are all examples of pre-existing criminal behaviours whose 
wrongness need not be explained in terms of their propensity to cause anxiety amongst the 
local communities in which they take place.20 However, they may also have this additional 
psychological impact, which gives us a distinct reason to criminalise them as part of a course 
of anti-social conduct. 
 Another noteworthy feature of the impact of anti-social behaviour is that it is typically 
cumulative. The psychological impact of individual tokens of the kinds of conduct just 
considered will often be trivial, perhaps being limited to temporary and non-severe responses 
like harassment, alarm and distress. Nobody is likely, for instance, to become a nervous wreck 
at the sight of a single piece of graffiti, or at a single rave that goes on past midnight. Even 
threats or harassment from strangers in the street are often easily and quickly forgotten if it 
becomes clear that the perpetrators have no actual intention to cause harm. Rather, 
residents’ anxieties about anti-social behaviour in their neighbourhood will often only make 
sense once we appreciate the persistent nature of that behaviour. We must therefore focus 
on entire courses of such conduct if we wish to form an adequate understanding of our 
reasons to criminalise it. 
 On those occasions when anti-social behaviour does have such a cumulative effect, its 
impact on quality of life can be devastating. This is because the exhausting and depressing 
effects of general long-term anxiety are amplified by the local context of anti-social 
behaviour. A reliable cure for many fears and anxieties is to alter one’s conduct in order to 
avoid the relevant threat; indeed, this is the response to which we are naturally inclined. This 
avoidance strategy is not available, though, when the source of the relevant threat is within 
                                                 
20 Typologies of anti-social behaviour have evolved in a way that reflects this. Most now include such 
categories as misuse of public space and ‘environmental’ damage alongside the previously familiar categories 
of neighbour disputes and direct intimidation: see e.g. Donoghue (2010) pp. 18-23; Millie (2009) pp. 11-13.  
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the community in which one lives. In these cases, one will be practically unable to escape the 
threat, and thus also the relevant anxiety – which in turn will also tend to make one feel more 
anxious. Because of this inescapable quality, the psychological impact of the worst cases of 
anti-social behaviour can also be self-generating. 
 The most serious cases of anti-social behaviour are those that have this characteristic 
cumulative impact on quality of life within local communities. The local context both explains 
the gravity of these cases and distinguishes them from other kinds of conduct whose 
criminalisation may be thought to be grounded in their anxiety-causing effects: for example, 
harassment.21 These are also the same features that motivated the original proposals for the 
ASBO. It was felt that, even though some individual instances of anti-social behaviour were 
caught by existing criminal offences, this was not sufficient to protect residents of local 
communities from the cumulative psychological effects of such behaviour (Labour Party 
1995). This rationale has rarely been addressed in academic discussion of the criminalisation 
of anti-social conduct, which has tended to focus (as we saw above) on the propensity of such 
conduct to cause offence. Perhaps this is due to a perception that the regulation of anti-social 
behaviour is, as a matter of political reality, primarily a way of enforcing conventional social 
norms. I make no comment here on whether such a perception is justified; in any event, it is 
worth emphasising that the harmful character of the most serious cases of anti-social 
behaviour is nevertheless both real and severe. 
 All of this suggests that defining anti-social behaviour in terms of its psychological 
impact on local communities improves on the current definition by catching only those cases 
that are most serious and that are closest to those that formed the original rationale for the 
ASBO. Next, we must ask whether this definition solves any of the problems with the current 
definition identified in part 1 above. First, let us consider the question of the reason-
responsiveness of feelings. As we saw, it is plausibly an objection to the current definition of 
anti-social behaviour that it makes criminalisation contingent upon putative victims’ irrational 
judgements. Since the proposed definition also concerns the propensity of conduct to cause 
negative feelings, how can it meet this objection? 
The answer lies in the limitation of liability to those who have caused justifiable 
anxiety. The sense of justifiability implicated in this definition is special, for it refers not to the 
                                                 
21 See Protection from Harassment Act 1997 ss 1, 2 and 4. 
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reasonableness of the feelings themselves, but to the reasonableness of the judgements 
underlying those feelings. As we have seen, ‘anxiety’ refers to the unpleasant psychological 
and physiological effects that result from perceptions of threats; thus, anxiety per se is neither 
reasonable nor unreasonable. Rather, to require that feelings of anxiety be justifiable is to 
require that we rule out precisely those feelings that were found to be problematic above: 
namely, those feelings that are caused by irrational judgements. 
Anxiety is obviously justifiable in this sense to the extent that it is based on rational 
judgement. For example, because of the local context of anti-social behaviour, residents will 
often have knowledge of the perpetrators’ previous conduct that will provide a reasonable 
basis for a judgement that a threat exists. Even when the perpetrators are otherwise unknown 
to their victims, it may still be rational for those victims to feel threatened. For instance, 
campaigns of insults and hate-speech provide direct evidence of disrespect for one’s 
interests. Other forms of harassment can evidence such disrespect even when they are not 
explicit threats, because of how they are conventionally understood: aggressive shouting by 
a stranger would usually be understood to be intimidating, whatever its substantive content 
(Simester & von Hirsch 2002, pp. 277-278). Alternatively, one may properly infer a more 
general disrespect for one’s interests from other kinds of wrongdoing. An obvious example in 
the anti-social behaviour context is vandalism: extensive damage to a community’s physical 
environment can reasonably contribute to a perception that the community’s interests more 
generally will not be accorded sufficient importance in the future.22 
The scope of ‘justifiable’ anxiety may be wider than this, though. As we have seen, not 
all anxiety can be explained in terms of conscious, reason-responsive judgements about 
threats. Certainly, many fears will evaporate if we realise that our perception of the threat 
concerned was mistaken. However, those forms of anxiety that are prompted by unconscious 
perceptions of threats often do not respond to reason. Again, the example of social anxiety 
illustrates this. Say that I am able to identify the unconscious source of this anxiety on 
reflection: for example, that the new people I meet will not respect me. At a theoretical level, 
                                                 
22 In this respect, I concur with James Q Wilson and George Kelling’s ‘broken windows’ theory of 
neighbourhood disorder: see Wilson & Kelling (1982). The UK experience seems to support this claim: 
perceptions of anti-social behaviour are higher in those neighbourhoods with high levels of ‘physical disorder’ 
(Flatley et al 2010, p. 117). However, this claim should be distinguished from Wilson and Kelling’s more 
controversial hypothesis that the prevalence of these kinds of behaviour in a given neighbourhood in fact 
tends to lead to more serious crime occurring there. Contemporary criminology is generally against this idea: 
see Burney (2009, pp. 24-28) for a summary of the relevant literature. 
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I might completely reject the idea that I should be concerned with such a possibility. Indeed, 
I might positively resent the fact that I feel anxious for such an inadequate reason. This might 
not do anything, though, to stop me from actually feeling anxious. Despite my best efforts, I 
may not be able to make my feelings conform to my rational judgements. 
 Anxiety is therefore a problem case for those who wish to rule out unreasonable 
feelings as grounds for criminalisation, since it is unclear whether it is truly belief-mediated 
(Thomson 1990, p. 250). On the one hand, anxiety always seems to be causally connected at 
least to a perceived possibility of a threat, even if that perception is unconscious. On the 
other, feelings of anxiety themselves often seem to arise in pre-rational ways. Precisely how 
we should respond to such a complex mental phenomenon will depend on our reasons for 
excluding feelings based on unreasonable beliefs as grounds of criminalisation. I suggested 
above that it is unfair to oblige actors not to cause others to experience such feelings, because 
those others can avoid those feelings simply by making the judgements about their situation 
that we can reasonably expect them to make. If this is correct, then we ought to admit the 
causation of pre-rational anxiety as a potentially legitimate ground of criminalisation. To the 
extent that agents cannot control their feelings, it is generally fair to expect others to make 
at least some effort not to cause them to feel anxious. 
 I will not attempt to settle this issue here. It will suffice for the moment to note that, 
in any event, the proposed definition would rule out the criminalisation of conduct on the 
grounds of its propensity to cause unreasonable anxiety, at least to the extent that such 
anxiety is truly belief-mediated. Finally, let us consider whether the proposed definition also 
improves on the current definition’s balance between its preventive goals and the 
preservation of liberty and autonomy. As we saw, harassment, alarm and distress often 
represent only trivial and fleeting setbacks to our psychological interests, compared to the 
great losses to autonomy that preventing them can cause. By contrast, if we were to define 
anti-social behaviour in terms of its propensity to cause serious anxiety amongst local 
communities, then we would target only the gravest wrongs associated with such conduct. In 
turn, the role of official discretion in enforcing such a prohibition would be greatly diminished, 
for far fewer people would fall within its scope. 
 The damage to citizens’ autonomy threatened by anti-social behaviour legislation 
would also be minimised under this definition. Whereas a prohibition against causing 
harassment, alarm and distress is very difficult to avoid, it is very easy to avoid causing the 
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kind of serious anxiety contemplated in this section. This change would be reinforced by 
focussing explicitly on the cumulative effects of whole courses of behaviour. If ASBOs could 
only be imposed in virtue of an entire course of anti-social conduct, then it is difficult to 
imagine any situation in which one would have to forego some valuable activity in order to 
be certain of avoiding liability. Of course, this still leaves us with the problem that the current 
definition does not contain a culpability requirement. However, redefining anti-social 
behaviour would also give us a chance to correct this. For instance, it would be easy enough 
to specify that the relevant effects must be brought about intentionally or recklessly, if this 
were thought to be necessary. 
 
Two-Step Prohibitions 
 
These observations suggest that to redefine anti-social behaviour in the way that I have 
proposed would satisfy several important conditions of legitimate criminalisation. I have 
deliberately stopped short of concluding, though, that such conduct ought to be criminalised, 
all things considered. One reason to be wary of such conclusions is the existence of other 
means of regulation besides the criminal law. Because criminal conviction has such severe 
consequences for those who are subjected to it, it is often said that criminalisation should be 
a ‘last resort’ for dealing with wrongful conduct.23 One possible meaning of this maxim is that 
we should only criminalise conduct if we have decisive reason to prefer criminalisation to 
other kinds of legal regulation, or even to no regulation at all. In the anti-social behaviour 
context, we might want to consider purely civil injunctions, administrative regulation or even 
some kind of alternative dispute resolution before we pursue direct criminalisation (Duff & 
Marshall 2006, pp. 67-75). 
 Equally though, we sometimes have good reasons to prefer criminalisation to other 
forms of legal intervention. Such reasons certainly include the unique deterrent force of the 
criminal law: as we have seen, the most serious courses of anti-social conduct can have a 
profound negative impact on the lives of the communities in which they take place, which 
gives us a strong reason to seek to prevent them. However, we also saw above that such 
conduct can be seriously wrongful. Thus, the state has reason to condemn the worst anti-
                                                 
23 For an exploration of this idea, see Husak (2004). 
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social behaviour, as well as merely to deter it. Other methods of legal regulation lack the 
condemnatory force of criminal conviction and punishment. Thus, in deciding whether or not 
we should prefer criminalisation to these other types of regulation, we can legitimately 
include its condemnatory potential in its favour.24 
 In the space that remains, I will not attempt a comprehensive analysis of the relative 
merits of the various forms of intervention available to legislators for dealing with anti-social 
behaviour. This would, at any rate, require a great deal of further empirical work. Rather, I 
will focus on one particular feature of anti-social behaviour that might motivate arguments 
against criminalising it: that there can be reasonable disagreement about when it falls within 
the legitimate reach of the criminal law. I do not mean by this that there can be reasonable 
disagreement about the features of anti-social behaviour that make it wrongful, or that might 
make it apt for criminalisation. I have already said what I believe these features to be. Rather, 
I mean that there might be disagreement about whether particular instances of anti-social 
behaviour actually have these features. 
 We have already encountered some of the qualities of anti-social behaviour that make 
it susceptible to reasonable disagreement about when it falls within the legitimate scope of 
the criminal law. One is that individual instances of anti-social behaviour are often only 
trivially wrongful: only the cumulative impact of entire courses of such conduct can ground 
criminalisation. Given this, there may be reasonable disagreement as to how long a course of 
conduct must last or how severe its impact must become before it can be said to have 
impacted on the victims’ quality of life to the required extent. For instance, for how long must 
a gang on an estate cause residents to feel threatened before their conduct may be 
criminalised? A year might seem sufficient and (say) a single weekend insufficient. However, 
we will probably have no definite answer for a precise term of days, weeks or months.  
 Another quality of anti-social behaviour that makes it particularly prone to such 
disagreement is that its significance is often contingent upon its social context. This is 
especially problematic if one is convinced that the propensity to cause unreasonable negative 
feelings is not a sound basis for criminalisation. If there can be disagreement about the 
significance of an action, then there may be disagreement about whether that action can form 
a reasonable basis for a perception of a threat, and thus for feelings of anxiety. For example, 
                                                 
24 The idea that the wrongness of conduct provides a reason for, as well as a necessary condition of, 
criminalisation is a defining feature of what Duff calls ‘positive’ legal moralism: (2007) ch. 4.3. 
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we may be certain that racist insults or particularly severe invasions of personal space can 
properly be described as threatening when perpetrated by strangers. Likewise, we may be 
certain that mere loitering cannot be described as such. Opinions may differ, though, about 
particular cases of noise nuisance or vandalism. If we ought not to feel threatened by such 
conduct, then it ought not to count as part of a course of criminal behaviour. 
 This kind of ambiguity as to the legitimate reach of the criminal law presents a problem 
in legislating criminal prohibitions. Two familiar kinds of solution are available. One is to 
specify in concrete terms a certain kind of conduct that approximates the relevant wrong and 
to create a prohibition against this. Speed limits are a well-known example of this kind of 
solution: they prohibit a concrete kind of conduct (driving above a certain speed) that is 
approximately equivalent to dangerous driving (Duff 2007, ch. 7.3). This kind of solution is 
also suited to certain kinds of conduct that might contribute to a course of anti-social 
behaviour. In English law, for instance, there is a criminal prohibition against noise nuisances 
that exceed a specified ‘permitted level’ of volume.25 This solution greatly reduces the 
potential for disagreement about the content of the law, even when such disagreement 
persists in the moral sphere. 
 However, such certainty comes at the price of poorly defining the relevant wrong. 
Concrete limits will tend to result in some people being wrongly condemned, whilst excluding 
from liability others whose actions are worthy of condemnation (ibid.). Additionally, they will 
not be practical for some forms of anti-social behaviour. Although it may be easy to specify in 
concrete terms when a loud noise should be deemed sufficiently severe to engage the 
criminal law, the same is not true of insults or threats. Given this, legislators have a good 
reason of principle to prefer a second kind of solution: holding people to abstract standards 
of conduct, with some discretion left to legal decision-makers as to when that standard is 
met. This is the solution adopted for so-called ‘public nuisance’ in English law, which is 
conduct that ‘materially affects the comfort and convenience of life of a class of Her Majesty’s 
subjects’.26 Although such standards lack the certainty of specific limits, they are preferable 
                                                 
25 Noise Act 1996 ss. 3-5; Permitted Level of Noise (England) Directions 2008. 
26 Attorney-General v PYA Quarries Ltd [1957] 2 QB 169,184. 
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in principle because they more accurately identify why such conduct might be worthy of 
criminalisation.27 
 We can now see how reasonable disagreement about the substantive content of 
criminal prohibitions might ground a principled appeal for keeping anti-social behaviour 
outside the criminal law, even given a strong pro tanto case for criminalising it. The precise 
limits of criminal offences based on abstract standards are inherently uncertain. This 
uncertainty is aggravated in the context of anti-social behaviour, given its cumulative and 
sometimes context-dependent nature. It is common ground that the rule of law requires legal 
rules to be clear, determinate and capable of being obeyed, especially in the criminal law, 
given the consequences that attach to criminal conviction.28 However, even the revised 
definition of anti-social behaviour suggested above would likely fall foul of these criteria to 
some extent. Hence, even though we have good reason to criminalise some anti-social 
behaviour, the potential for reasonable disagreement about the scope of any measure 
prohibiting it gives us reason to refrain from doing so.  
 Nevertheless, we need not think that to refrain from criminalising anti-social 
behaviour simply means to ignore it. As we have seen, it might mean using other kinds of legal 
regulation than criminalisation. But it might also mean making only qualified use of the 
criminal law. As I emphasised above, we are not only permitted in principle to criminalise the 
most serious courses of anti-social behaviour, but we have good reason to criminalise them, 
because the state has good reason both to condemn and to deter effectively this kind of 
serious wrongdoing. The problem with this is that criminal prohibitions against such conduct, 
if they are to correctly describe the relevant wrong, are likely to be unacceptably vague. A 
solution is therefore required that allows us to criminalise the relevant behaviour, correctly 
identified, whilst eliminating or minimising the injustice associated with inherently uncertain 
legal rules. 
This is where two-step prohibitions have a role to play. By using a two-step prohibition 
such as the ASBO, the state can make conduct potentially subject to criminal liability without 
directly criminalising it in uncertain terms. This is made possible by separating procedurally 
                                                 
27 For further reflection on the relative merits of concrete ‘rules’ and abstract ‘standards’ in criminal law, see 
Schlag (1985); Alexander & Ferzan (2009, ch. 8). 
28 For theoretical treatments of these requirements of the rule of law, see Fuller (1969) ch. 2; Raz (1979) ch. 
11. On the importance of such requirements to justice more generally conceived, see Finnis (1980) pp. 270-
273. 
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the specification of the relevant standard of conduct and the creation of a criminal 
prohibition. The standard of conduct is specified at the first stage: that is, in the provisions 
governing the imposition of orders, which define the targeted wrong in an accurate and easily 
understandable but inevitably indeterminate way. An actual criminal offence, however, is not 
effectively created until the second stage: that is, in the imposition of an order, when the 
court warns the subject, in specific terms, about what future conduct of theirs will result in 
criminal liability. 
This way of understanding two-step prohibitions acknowledges that guiding citizens’ 
conduct is an important function of rules of criminal law. As we have already seen, this is not 
the only function of such rules: they also serve to guide ex post judgement and condemnation 
of citizens’ conduct, which gives rise to the idea that only wrongful conduct may be 
criminalised. However, the conduct-guiding function of such rules is also important in their 
justification. This helps to explain why it is easier to justify criminalising anti-social behaviour 
only at the second stage of a two-step prohibition. Whilst courses of such conduct may be 
worthy of state condemnation even before an order is imposed, the legitimacy of 
condemnation is not the only factor that determines the legitimacy of criminalisation. We 
also have reason to ensure that criminal prohibitions provide adequate guidance to citizens; 
thus, we have reason to refrain from condemning culpable actors until their obligations can 
be specified in adequate detail. 
This is not to suggest that just any kind or level of definitional uncertainty in general 
criminal prohibitions provides a conclusive argument in favour of the use of a two-step order. 
Anti-social behaviour is a special case in this regard: the belief-mediated and cumulative 
nature of its impact makes it particularly difficult to define in tolerably precise and concrete 
terms. Nevertheless, this line of argument does have general – and potentially radical – 
implications. The availability of two-step orders prevents us from having always to make a 
stark choice between the ends of criminalisation and the maintenance of the rule of law. Once 
we appreciate this, we might find that there are other kinds of conduct that would also be 
best regulated through ASBO-like schemes. Particularly when we only have strong reason to 
criminalise whole courses of a certain kind of behaviour, schemes of this kind enable us to do 
so whilst giving actors a fair chance to avoid criminal liability. 
 We can helpfully contrast this justification of two-step prohibitions with the view that 
they are unacceptable because they punish mere ‘defiance’ (Ashworth 2004, p. 288). Clearly 
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this would be a valid criticism if this were indeed the sole function of such prohibitions: the 
fact that conduct defies authority might sometimes make it wrongful, but it does not 
necessarily do so. On the view suggested here, though, ASBOs (sufficiently refined) would not 
simply be individualised instructions to their subjects that render disobedience punishable. 
Rather, they would be authoritative determinations of whether a given course of conduct is 
an instance of the prohibited wrong. Seen in this way, two-step prohibitions would not 
represent an individualised criminal law, imposing entirely new obligations on those who are 
subject to them. In their abstract form, the standards they impose would be generally 
applicable; individual orders simply clarify particular actors’ obligations, and grant a margin 
of error as to their scope.  
 None of this is meant to deny that both the ASBO in its current form and its proposed 
replacements fail to live up to this ideal. As we noted at the outset, these effectively 
circumvent the traditional due process requirements of the criminal law. Additionally, the fact 
that they can include any restriction deemed necessary to prevent further instances of the 
targeted conduct means that they can impose disproportionately onerous burdens on those 
who are subject to them. Nevertheless, it is possible to imagine a regime of two-step orders 
that does not have these features. We might easily require that the procedural rules of the 
criminal law apply to the hearings at which orders are made (as would be the case for the 
proposed Criminal Behaviour Order), and that the orders prohibit only further instances of 
the targeted conduct itself. Indeed, these limitations would follow naturally on this view, 
given that the aim of two-step prohibitions would be to provide an indirect way of 
criminalising the conduct concerned. 
Nevertheless, problems with the two-step model would remain even if it were revised 
as I have suggested. In particular, a great deal of power would remain vested in the courts 
that are charged with framing individual orders. Whilst it is preferable for these courts to 
make decisions about the interpretation of uncertain legal definitions than unaccountable 
enforcement agencies, they will still have a wide-ranging power over the freedom of those 
who may become subject to ASBOs. This is problematic because magistrates might be thought 
to lack both the appropriate training and the democratic accountability and legitimacy 
necessary to make what amount to important public policy decisions about the appropriate 
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balance between liberty, autonomy and security.29 As such, it is important that any change in 
the structure of ASBOs and the definition of the conduct that they target should be 
accompanied by additional legislative guidance on their interpretation and application. The 
above discussion suggests several points that any such guidance should address. 
 First of all, any new legislation must clearly distinguish between the kind of serious 
anxiety that it would aim to target and the broader current definition of conduct that causes 
‘harassment, alarm and distress’. There are two dimensions to this: both the type of harm 
involved and its magnitude. As regards the type of harm, it should be made clear that ASBOs 
are not simply a way of controlling any behaviour that causes others to feel bad, or that others 
find morally offensive. They are specifically a way of controlling behaviour of the kind 
originally cited in support of them: that is, behaviour that causes people to feel unsafe within 
their own local communities. As regards the magnitude of the harm, it should be made clear 
that the harms targeted are persistent and severe. ASBOs should not be used where the 
harms suffered are only fleeting and trivial; agencies of the state should be able to 
demonstrate that the conduct concerned has had a significant detrimental impact on the 
quality of life of at least one person other than the actor. 
 A further restriction on the kind of conduct that any new legislation should target has 
been discussed at length above: that anxiety must be a justifiable response to it. Legislation 
should only prohibit conduct that causes unreasonable feelings, at least to the extent that 
those feelings are truly belief-mediated. To put this point in more readily understandable 
terms, it should be made clear that people are not to be held responsible for the poor 
judgements of others. For example, to the extent that it is really true that the loitering 
teenagers’ conduct gives local residents no reason whatsoever to feel threatened, it should 
be clear that the residents’ feelings are not eligible for protection through the criminal law. 
 Finally, it should be clear that the restrictions imposed by individual orders must 
extend no further than prohibiting future instances of the targeted conduct. As we have seen, 
this condition is a necessary consequence of conceiving of two-step orders as a means of 
indirect criminalisation. However, requiring courts to consider more carefully the relationship 
between the restrictions imposed by individual orders and the conduct that those orders seek 
prevent may also have an important instrumental function. One reason to prefer the 
                                                 
29 For further development of this kind of criticism of two-step prohibitions, see Simester & von Hirsch (2011) 
pp. 219-220. 
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proposed new definition of anti-social behaviour to the current definition is that it strikes a 
more favourable balance between the preventive goals of the legislation and the autonomy 
of citizens. By requiring courts to ensure that they do not limit citizens’ autonomy any more 
than is necessary, we also invite reflection on the preventive goals of particular orders. In 
practice, we could expect this to give defendants an extra layer of protection against the 
draconian use of such orders to prevent harms which are insufficiently severe to justify 
criminalisation. 
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper, I hope to have shown that we have, in principle, a strong case for criminalising 
anti-social behaviour through a scheme of two-step prohibitions such as the ASBO. I argued 
that we should not be sceptical about criminalising such behaviour simply because it sets back 
psychological interests, rather than interests of other kinds. However, the current statutory 
definition of anti-social behaviour is nevertheless too broad, because it does not account for 
the belief-mediated nature of some feelings, and greatly reduces citizens’ autonomy in the 
name of securing modest preventive benefits. In order to meet these objections, I proposed 
that we should redefine anti-social behaviour as a course of conduct that causes others to 
experience serious and justifiable anxiety about the safety of their local community. The 
precise scope of this definition, however, inevitably remains uncertain. I therefore concluded 
that we have reason to use two-step prohibitions to supplement this definition, since these 
provide a way of indirectly criminalising the targeted conduct whilst clarifying the nature and 
scope of actors’ obligations. 
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